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be authorized to introduce bills and resolutions throughout the remainder of this day and to have statements printed in support thereof in the RECORD as though read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP

Mr. BYRD. Now, Mr. President, while we are waiting and we have the rollcall vote ordered on the resolution to create a select committee, I have discussed with the distinguished Republican leader a resolution that would extend the life of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group and I am prepared to send a resolution to the desk to extend the life of that group without naming the members thereof at this time. I have shown this resolution to the distinguished Republican leader. I believe that we have discussed it. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the consideration immediately of this resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

Mr. DOLE. No objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair hears none. It is so ordered.

The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution, S. Res. 30, to reauthorize and redesignate the Senate Arms Control Observer Group.

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

SENATE ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished minority leader and I are today offering a resolution which would reauthorize, for the life of the 100th Congress, the Arms Control Observer Group. We are also redesignating, in this measure, the members of that successful monitoring and advising body.

The observer group was created by the Senate on February 28, 1985, in the early days of the 99th Congress. Its purpose is to supplement the activities of the Foreign Relations Committee by providing a more regular and systematic involvement of the full Senate in any arms control negotiations which the United States is officially undertaking with the Soviet Union, without in any sense assuming the role of participants or negotiators in such talks. While the Foreign Relations Committee oversees arms control negotiations on a continuing basis, the full Senate had, prior to the creation of this group, focused its attention only sporadically on the vital aspects of such talks, usually developing a knowledge and understanding of the issues being negotiated after the fact—that is, after a draft treaty had been signed by the executive branch. The result of this fitful process had been generally unsatisfactory, and we sought to avoid a recurrence of the problems of the 1970's, when three

successive arms control treaties, signed by three Presidents, were never approved for ratification by the Senate. These include the SALT II Treaty of 1979, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976.

The U.S. Senate has the constitutional responsibility of providing advice and consent in the making of treaties. This responsibility imposes upon Senators the obligation to become as knowledgeable as possible concerning the salient issues which are being addressed in the context of the negotiating process. Any accord with the Soviet Union to control or reduce our strategic weapons carries considerable weight for our Nation. It will vitally affect our national security and that of our allies. Any agreement must be undergirded by substantial national consensus to stand the test of time, and I believe that such a consensus is best achieved through the traditional treaty-making process which has been followed in the field of strategic arms control agreements.

I feel particularly strongly that it is far better for the United States to walk away from cosmetic agreements, which provide only the illusion of progress on arms reduction, and certainly, as well, walk away from any agreement which runs counter to either our own national security interests or those of our allies and friends. Only those arms reduction agreements which enhance our military security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union should be contemplated. I am sure that this sentiment is shared by all Members of this body.

Mr. President, the Senate Arms Control Observer Group acquitted itself admirably during the 99th Congress. The distinguished minority leader and I led the group's first trip to the Geneva talks from March 9 to 12, 1985, and subsequently, the group returned to Geneva to consult with our negotiators and to exchange views with the Soviet negotiators during each of the negotiating rounds, approximately every 3 months—with the exception of the last round, this past October, when the press of Senate business was too intense for the scheduled visit to be accomplished.

I think there has been a general consensus that the long-term cross-fertilization of views between the members of the group and our negotiators has been very healthy and, in fact, a new development in executive-legislative relations in this field. In addition to the visits to the negotiating site, the group developed excellent rapport with the key executive branch officials, such as Ambassador Paul Nitze and Ambassador Ron Lehman, here in Washington, and very satisfactory arrangements were developed for regular briefings of the group by those officials on the status of the negotiations and the perspective of the executive branch on where they were going. I might add that I believe the executive

branch officials also benefited from the perspectives conveyed by the Senators on the group as to the status of those talks as well.

Mr. PRESIDENT, I have heard nothing but praise regarding the maturity, the responsibility, the continuing and steady high level of interest, the expertise and common sense of the Senators on this group in carrying out their responsibilities, and I congratulate them for that. I particularly want to commend the four cochairs, including the distinguished Senator from Alaska, Mr. STEVENS, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, Mr. NUNN, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, Mr. PELL, and the distinguished Senator from Indiana, Mr. LUGAR, for their leadership in this regard.

One often hears the complaint from officials in the executive branch that Congress can't keep a secret. Well, I can think of no better refutation of that thesis than the history of this group. In accord with arrangements made with the Secretary of State, the Senators in this group received timely information on the sensitive details of the negotiations, regularly, week by week, over nearly a 2-year period. Mr. President, I cannot recount a single instance of a leak of any kind coming out of that group, to the news media, which in any way could be construed to compromise the information passed to the group. On the other hand, I cannot say the same for some officials of the executive branch, because it was often clear that substantial information was coming out of the executive branch, and I believe that there were instances when the information leakage could well have weakened the hands of our negotiators. I deplore that kind of behavior, and I am proud of the fact that the 12 Senators who participated as members of this group were above it. I have every reason to be confident that this will remain the case. For my part, I am appointing the same Senators from the Democratic side of the aisle to serve in the 100th Congress. Messrs. CLAIBORNE PELL and SAM NUNN will continue to serve as the Democratic cochairs. In addition, I am renewing the appointments of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. KENNEDY, the distinguished Senator from New York, Mr. MOYNIHAN, and the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, Mr. GORE.

I am confident that the continuing process of monitoring the negotiations during the 100th Congress will put the Senate in a much better position to consider any treaty which might result from those talks. Furthermore, I am confident that the advice and consultation that the group can provide our negotiators during this process will provide a helpful perspective for them on the views of key Senators.

In closing, I would like also to extend my appreciation to the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, to our chief

negotiator in Geneva, Ambassador Max Kampelman and his team, and to Mr. Nitze here in Washington, and his assistants, for their cooperation in this effort, and my hope for a continuation of the excellent relationship that has evolved during the life of this enterprise.

ARMS CONTROL OBSERVER GROUP

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator BYRD today in introducing this resolution, reauthorizing a Senate Arms Control Observer Group for the 100th Congress.

VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO 99TH CONGRESS

The bipartisan observer group which we formed the first day of the 99th Congress served the Senate very well throughout that Congress. It monitored the arms control negotiations in Geneva; worked effectively with the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, which have important responsibilities for arms control issues; and helped all of us achieve a better understanding of the complex issues under negotiation.

The members of the group—Republicans and Democrats—brought a true bipartisan spirit to their work. They also maintained a very cooperative relationship with the administration, including with the President's top arms control advisers here in Washington and with Max Kampelman's outstanding negotiating team in Geneva. They set a fine example for the rest of the Senate in how to go about dealing with these critical issues. All of them deserve our thanks—the administrative cochairman, Senator STEVENS; the other three cochairmen, Senators LUGAR, NUNN, and PELL; and all the other members of the group.

100TH CONGRESS NEEDS SIMILAR INPUT FROM GROUP

It is my expectation that the Arms Control Observer Group can provide an equally valuable service in the 100th Congress.

Arms control issues will remain central to our Nation's security, and a top priority of the administration. Building on the progress achieved in Reykjavik and Geneva, the President is determined to continue exploring every avenue to achieve a significant, balanced and verifiable nuclear arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union. We can expect the talks in Geneva to be active, and we can reasonably hope they will be productive. It is useful, and important, that the Senate be represented in Geneva, and be heard in the counsels of the administration, as these events unfold.

The work of the observer group, as it did last Congress, will also impinge on our discussions and decisions on arms control-related issues across the board. And we have a great many of those issues to address—the nuclear testing treaties, SALT compliance, SDI and a whole host of others. While primary responsibility for consideration of those issues will continue to rest with Foreign Relations and Armed Services,

the observer group can play an important role in keeping the Senate informed of the substance and evolution of those issues, especially as they are dealt with in the Geneva talks. And that input can be critical to the judgments the Senate finally draws.

ABLE, EXPERIENCED REPUBLICANS TO BE NAMED

Assuming we pass this resolution—and I expect it will get the unanimous support it deserves—I will be designating the Republican members in the coming days. We will have a very able, very experienced group of Republicans, just as we did last year. I expect that the majority leader will also name a good group of Democrats. And I am confident that, together, that bipartisan group will continue to perform ably and responsibly, for the Senate and for the country.

Mr. President, let me congratulate the distinguished majority leader. As my colleagues may recall—maybe not my new colleagues—it was the idea of the distinguished Senator from West Virginia, Senator BYRD, that we do this in the first instance and it has worked very successfully. I believe it should be continued and I am happy to cosponsor this resolution.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Republican leader. I compliment the members of the observer group on both sides and in particular I compliment Mr. STEVENS, who during the past few years has in particular done the administrative work of the group in a very fine and dedicated manner. I commend all Members on both sides of the aisle, Republicans and Democrats, who made up that group, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Shultz, who originally did not let all of his weight down in supporting the resolution but upon several occasions observed to me that he was quite happy with the group and felt that it had contributed positively to his work and the work of the negotiators.

Now, Mr. President, have we acted on this resolution?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 30) was agreed to, as follows:

S. Res. 30

Resolved, That the bipartisan group of Senators designated by S. Res. 88, 99th Congress (agreed to February 18, 1985) is hereby redesignated and reauthorized to act during the 100th Congress as official observers on the United States delegation to any formal arms reduction or control negotiations to which the United States is a party (which group shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Senate Observer Group") and S. Res. 86, 99th Congress is hereby amended. The Group shall be headed by four Senators, serving as Co-Chairmen, two from the Majority party, to be appointed by the Majority Leader, Robert C. Byrd, and two from the Minority party, to be appointed by the Minority Leader, Robert Dole, one from each party to be appointed as Administrative Co-Chairman. The Majority and Minority Leaders shall serve on the Group in an ex officio capacity, and shall each appoint, in addition three other Senators to serve as

members of the Group. The appointments shall be made in writing to the President pro tempore of the Senate.

Only Senators appointed as members of the Group may participate in official travel and activities of the Group. In the event that either the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader does not travel on an official trip of the Observer Group, he may designate one other Senator not a member of the Group to travel and participate in the activities of the Group in his stead. Any vacancy occurring in the Senate Arms Control Observer Group shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made."

Sec. 2. (a) The Senate Observer Group is authorized, from funds made available under section 3, to employ such staff (including consultants at a daily rate of pay) in the manner and at a rate not to exceed that allowed for employees of a standing committee of the Senate under paragraph (3) of section 105 (e) of the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1968 (2 U.S.C. 61-1(e)), and incur such expenses as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out its duties and functions. Payments made under this section for receptions, meals, and food-related expenses shall be authorized, however, only for those actual expenses incurred by the Senate Observer Group in the course of conducting its official duties and functions, provided, that notwithstanding any other provision of this Resolution, such amounts received as reimbursement for such expenses shall not exceed \$6,000 in any fiscal year. Amounts received as reimbursement for such food expenses shall not be reported as income, and the expenses so reimbursed shall not be allowed as a deduction under title 26 of the United States Code. This provision is effective with respect to expenditures incurred on or after February 28, 1985.

(b) Each Co-Chairman of the Senate Observer Group is authorized to designate a professional staff member. The Designated Group staff shall also include, a secretary selected by, and responsible to, the Majority, and a secretary selected by, and responsible to, the Minority. The funds necessary to compensate any such staff member who is an employee of a Senate or of a Senate Committee, who has been designated to perform service for the Senate Observer Group, such staff member shall continue to be paid by such Senator or such Committee, as the case may be, but the account from which such staff member is paid shall be reimbursed for his services (including agency contributions when appropriate) out of funds made available under section 3(a) of this resolution. The four professional staff members, authorized by this subsection, shall serve all of the members of the Senate Observer Group, and carry out such other functions as their respective Co-Chairmen may specify.

(c) The Majority and Minority Leaders may each designate one staff member to serve the Observer Group. Funds necessary to compensate leadership staff shall be transferred from the funds made available under section 3(b) of this resolution to the respective account from which such designated staff member is paid.

(d) All foreign travel of the Group shall be authorized solely by the Majority and Minority Leaders, upon the recommendation of the Administrative Co-Chairmen. Participation by staff members in authorized foreign travel by the Group, access to all official activities and functions of the Group during such travel, and access to all classified briefings and information made available to the Group during such travel,

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shall be limited exclusively to delegation members with appropriate clearances. No travel or other funding shall be authorized by any Committee of the Senate for the use of staff, other than delegation staff, in regard to above mentioned activities, without the written authorization of the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader to the Chairman of such Committee."

Sec. 3. (a) The expenses of the Senate Observer Group shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate, out of the account of Miscellaneous Items, upon vouchers approved jointly by the Chairmen for Administrative purposes (except that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of salaries of employees who are paid at an annual rate). For any fiscal year, not more than \$400,000 shall be expended for staff (including consultants) and for expenses (excepting expenses incurred for foreign travel).

(b) In addition to the amount referred to in section 3(a), for any fiscal year, not more than \$150,000 shall be expended from the contingent fund of the Senate, out of the account for Miscellaneous Items, for Leadership staff as designated in section 2(c) for salaries and expenses (excepting expenses incurred for foreign travel).

(c)(1) Of the amount authorized in section 3(a), an amount not to exceed \$50,000 may be spent by the Senate Observer Group, with the prior approval of the Committee on Rules and Administration, to procure the temporary services (not in excess of one year) or intermittent services, including related and necessary expenses, of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, to make studies or advise the Senate Observer Group.

(2) Such services in the cases of individuals or organizations may be procured by contract as independent contractors, or in the case of individuals by employment at daily rates of compensation not in excess of the per diem equivalent to the highest gross rate of compensation which may be paid to a regular employee of a standing committee of the Senate. Such contracts shall not be subject to the provisions of section 3709 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5) or any other provisions of law requiring advertising.

(3) Any such consultant shall be selected by the Administrative co-chairmen acting jointly. The Senate Observer Group shall submit to the Committee on Rules and Administration information bearing on the qualifications of each consultant whose services are procured pursuant to this subsection, including organizations, and such information shall be retained by the Senate Observer Group and shall be made available for public inspection upon request.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the resolution was adopted.

Mr. DOLE. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

RESOLUTION RELATING TO SOVIET POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN

Mr. BYRD. Now, Mr. President, shortly I will have a resolution that deals with the Soviet policy toward Afghanistan.

I would expect to have a rollcall vote on that resolution. We could arrange to have that vote immediately following the vote on the resolution creating the select committee. But before I pro-

ceed I think Mr. MOYNIHAN has a suggested modification to the resolution.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have, Mr. President. May I speak to that?

Mr. BYRD. Yes.

Mr. DOLE. Is this on the Afghan?

Mr. BYRD. Yes, on the Afghan. I have not yet introduced it, but I yield to the distinguished Senator. I yield the floor so the distinguished Senator can comment on the resolution, a copy of which I have supplied.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the distinguished majority leader, and I relish the fact that this is the first occasion I have had this year to call him majority leader. It is a special pleasure.

Mr. President, it appears to me that this excellent resolution in support of the Afghan mujheddin, freedom fighters as they have been called, needs something added to the declaration of our commitment to that purpose and our concern with the transparent cynicism of Soviet calls for amnesty and cease fires. I think it should be recorded that American military aid to the mujheddin began within weeks of the Soviet invasion. The Soviet invasion took place at the end of December 1979. In mid-January, within weeks, the U.S. Government had commenced supplying small arms to the resistance which began almost immediately after the invasion took place.

I do not hesitate to bring this matter to the attention of the Senate in public because on February 15, 1980, the White House so announced. We made no secret of the fact that we were doing this, nor ought we have done so. The administration at the time imposed a grain embargo, canceled the Olympics and began supplying military aid. I think that commitment to supporting the Afghan resistance should continue. Mr. President, it is my hope that the amendment might be modified to provide for such an addition. In closing, Mr. President, might I ask that the newspaper report of the New York Times of February 16, 1980, recording this White House announcement be included in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[New York Times, February 16, 1980]

U.S. SUPPLYING AFGHAN INSURGENTS WITH ARMS IN A COVERT OPERATION

(By David Binder)

WASHINGTON.—The United States began an operation to supply light infantry weapons to Afghan insurgent groups in mid-January, White House officials said today.

The decision to funnel arms to rebel forces resisting Soviet troops in Afghanistan was made by the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council, which is chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser. It was subsequently approved by the President, a senior official of the council said.

The Central Intelligence Agency was assigned to carry out the covert mission, its first of this nature and magnitude since the Angolan civil war ended in 1976.

The arms being sent to Afghan insurgent groups are largely of Soviet design, including Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles, according to the officials, who declined to specify whether the weapons were manufactured in the Soviet bloc or in China. Nor would they confirm reports that some of the arms might have come from stocks of Soviet weapons acquired by Egypt.

ARMS SHIPPED THROUGH PAKISTAN

The weapons are being shipped to the Afghan insurgents through Pakistan, which shares a long frontier with Afghanistan through rough and lightly populated terrain.

On Wednesday the Egyptian Ministry of Defense announced that it has begun a military training program for Afghans opposed to the Soviet military intervention in their homeland and that Egypt would send them back with weapons. Previously Western military officials had indicated that China and Iran had shipped limited amounts of weapons to the insurgents.

The Soviet Union has accused China and the United States of aiding the anti-Communist forces in Afghanistan ever since uprisings began against a Marxist Government that was installed by a coup in April 1978. Moscow began to criticize Egypt for involvement in the situation at about the time that the Soviet forces intervened in Afghanistan on Dec. 27.

Rumors that a C.I.A. covert operation had begun to help supply Afghan insurgents started circulating in Washington in the second week of January.

Disclosure of the secret supply program comes at a time when Government specialists on Afghan affairs say that the pace of fighting between insurgents and Soviet forces accelerated over the last two weeks.

The specialists said today that in their estimates the Soviet forces had incurred about 3,000 casualties since the intervention.

The American analysts added that Afghan insurgents and regular Afghan Army units that had gone over to the insurgent side had probably suffered twice or three times the number of casualties incurred by the Russians. They put the Soviet casualty rate at about 500 a week, of whom they said about one in six had probably been killed.

During the Vietnam War, by comparison, in the last week of September 1966 there were 970 American casualties, at a time when the fighting was intensifying.

The bulk of the fighting has taken place in the north and northeast of Afghanistan, the analysts said, with pitched battles being fought for control of the town of Narin, in the north, since Jan. 8. Narin is strategically located astride a major supply route running between the Soviet frontier and Kabul, they remarked, and was also the home base of the Afghan Army's 19th Division.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I yield the floor and thank the Chair.

Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I send to the desk a certain modification which is agreeable to me and which has been proposed by Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. DOLE, and others. No action having been taken on the resolution, I believe I am entitled to make this modification.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution is so modified.

Is there further debate?

Mr. HUMPHREY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair will ask if the modification has been sent to the desk.

The Chair thanks the majority leader and thanks the Senator from New Hampshire.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I want to speak for a few moments on this important subject. I commend the Senator from West Virginia and others who are involved in trying to focus the attention of the Senate, the executive department, and the American people on the outrages being daily committed, day in and day out, month in and month out, year in and year out, by the Soviet Army in Afghanistan.

Mr. President, 1 million people have died in Afghanistan. How many is 1 million? If you apply that ratio to the United States, you are talking about 16 million dead Americans. Imagine 16 million dead Americans. But for the Afghans, it is not a matter of imagination, it is a matter of daily reality.

By the way the casualties are not just or even primarily combatants, those bearing arms, but primarily the casualties, the dead and the wounded, are women, the elderly, and children.

Surely, every Member of this body has heard of the Soviet toy bombs disseminated by helicopters throughout the country and whose sole, explicit, exclusive purpose is to blow off the hands of children and to blow off their faces.

It is ironic, tragic, that the establishment is enchanted with Mr. Gorbachev's public smile, while in the remoteness and privacy of Afghanistan, children have their smiles and faces blown away by Mr. Gorbachev's bombs.

One million children, five million driven into foreign exile. How many is 5 million? One-third of the Afghan population. If you apply that ratio to the United States, you are referring to 80 million driven into exile.

It is a horrible thing going on in Afghanistan. I am very sorry to say that for our part or for the most part it is business as usual with the Soviet Union even though the Soviet Union leadership is dripping with the blood of innocent Afghan victims. There is business as usual and more than that business as usual, more friendly and warm than at any time since the invasion in 1979.

Mr. President, to address the resolution before the body, it once again calls upon the executive to investigate and to evaluate our policy of continuing to recognize, by maintaining an embassy in Kabul, this criminal regime, a puppet regime set up by a Soviet invasion, maintained for 7 years by over 100,000 Soviet troops using the most advanced weapons and the most indescribable kind of brutality and violence.

It calls upon the State Department to do something we asked them to do last summer, I would emphasize, last June 25.

This body adopted an amendment offered by the Senator from West Virginia and this Senator from New Hampshire which asked the administration to examine this policy of continuing to maintain an embassy at the seat of the government against which freedom fighters of Afghanistan are struggling at this hour with our encouragement, to examine that duplicitous policy and to examine also, at the same time, the wisdom of permitting this criminal regime to maintain an embassy here in Washington as though that were some kind of legitimate regime instead of a gang of criminals cooperating with the Soviets in the genocide of their own people.

We are asking for a second time now.

As far as I can determine, there was never any investigation by the State Department in response to last summer's Senate resolution, nor has there been, as far as I can uncover, even a communication to Senator BYRD or to this Senator from New Hampshire in response to that first request.

The resolution before us also asks again, as we did last summer, for the administration to determine whether Soviet actions in Afghanistan constitute the international crime of genocide. It is no small question. As far as we can tell, last summer's request went unheeded, not even a response in writing to this Senator at least or any other Senator that I know of. Indeed, the only followup I have gotten was a reply of December 18 from the State Department in which it says, "There is no United States policy with respect to continued recognition."

How about that for a statement of duplicity? How about that for having one foot on each side of the fence? They do not even have a policy. They say, "There is no United States policy with respect to continued recognition."

Well, that is not true. There is a policy. The de facto policy is that we have an embassy there at the seat of that regime propped up by 100,000 Soviet troops. That is our policy, whether the State Department can see it or not.

So I commend the Senator from West Virginia for renewing his effort in this important matter and I encourage my colleagues to join with us in trying to force the administration to take a stronger role, to bring some pressures to bear beyond the military pressure—diplomatic pressures, economic pressures, the pressures of international public opinion, in which latter categories we are failing to do anything at all, to the shame of this country and the principles for which it stands.

I thank the Chair.

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from South Carolina [Mr. HOLLINGS] wishes to address

his remarks to the matter of creating a select committee. The yeas and nays have been ordered on that.

As soon as the distinguished Senator from South Carolina finishes his statement, I would be very happy to proceed with a vote on that. I understand Mr. GARN has to catch a plane. Then we can deal with the Afghan resolution.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON IRAN AND NICARAGUA

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I will be as brief as I possibly can. In fact, I have done my level best to just quietly go along on this issue for some time. However, Mr. President, it appears now that I am prepared to vote against the resolution and I take this opportunity to explain why.

What you have involved here, Mr. President, are three particular policies. One deals with the endeavor by the executive branch—the President and the White House—to open up lines of communication for an association or affiliation with a possible future successor Iranian Government. It is quite obvious that the Carter administration was found totally devoid of a policy after the fall of the shah, and we had not built up any inroads there since that time.

Yet, many people go mentally back to the loss of our Marines at Beirut, an act which we all regretted and condemned Iran for. Still we live in the real world and that is the reality by which we judge whether or not this Iran initiative was a good or bad policy. I think it was an honest endeavor and I do not think it was any kind of callous effort such as, "Heck, we can lose Marines any time we want to, but let us get on with the Iranians". It was not that kind of thing at all. Rather this administration was trying to open up channels of communication with the future government. If did not work. But it was an honest effort.

Second, with respect to the hostages, it is now clear we were paying ransom while at the same time we were chastising everyone else not to. That was a mistake. But that is what we now know to have been the policy.

Third, there was the \$100 million in aid to the Contras which Congress enacted on October 1. There are those around here who did not like that vote, and in my opinion are using every effort in order to thwart it, turn it back around, and reverse that policy. But I happen to support the President on that policy.

Those are the three policies involved here now. Bad or good, mistaken or not, that is what occurred. And it is also quite apparent to everyone involved in this area that the White House, and the administration were doing their dead-level best to keep the